*CONTEXT†
Despite the September 2018 Sochi ceasefire agreement between Russia and Turkey, the al-Assad regime has continued to escalate the bombing and shelling of several communities in north-west (NW) Syria since May 2019. The attacks have intensified significantly since January 2020; by March of the same year, the regime had taken over the entire M5 highway, several strategic cities and towns in southern Idlib including Maret Al-Numan and Saraqib, and a significant part of Aleppo’s countryside. This offensive caused a massive displacement wave of nearly one million people, according to the Response Coordination Group (RCG). On 5 March 2020, Turkey and Russia announced another ceasefire agreement in NW Syria. Yet, with direct support from Russia, the regime continues to target several areas to the south of the M4 highway with bombing, shelling, and infiltration manoeuvres.
The Emerging Russian-Turkish Dynamics
Since reaching the 5 March ceasefire agreement, the relationship between Ankara and Moscow has continued to evolve and expand from Idlib, to north-east Syria, to Libya, to the Caucasus. Although they back opposing sides, they often negotiate and coordinate their activities, sidelining Western influence in the region.
Different rounds of negotiations, between Putin and Erdogan personally or on the military or diplomatic technical levels, appear to have allowed the two powers to compartmentalise their disagreements on certain issues to allow more cooperation on others, despite the ongoing battles between their local allies.
During 2020, the tensions between Moscow and Ankara over Libya and the Caucasus often translated into aggressive statements in Idlib, in particular the Russian boycott of the joint patrols across the M4 agreed upon in the 5 March 2020 agreement. Russia has pushed aggressively for Turkey to decrease its military presence in NW Syria by withdrawing from 12 observation posts in areas recently recaptured by the regime. Turkey withdrew from said posts, and then expanded its military presence in other areas to indicate a shift in its military strategy from observation to defence.
As Turkish forces completed their withdrawal from these observation posts, they established new military posts in the south of Idlib, the north-west of Latakia, and the western countryside of Aleppo. This raised the total number of Turkish posts in NW Syria from 68 (prior to the 12-post withdrawal) to 76, twenty of which are in the Jabal al-Zawiya area. These bases constitute a “military defence shield” along the contact lines with the Syrian regime and its allies. Turkey has been bolstering these posts with thousands of combatant soldiers, vehicles, and equipment coming into the region through the Kafr Lucin military crossing. It is estimated that, in addition to 20,000 soldiers deployed to Idlib by April 2020, Turkey has recently sent 6,000 soldiers, 7,500 military vehicles including heavy artillery, rocket launchers, radars, 200 tanks, and armoured personnel carriers.
Russia-Turkey tensions in Idlib peaked on 26 October 2020, a few days after Turkish forces began dismantling the 9th Turkish Observation Post in the city of Morek. Russian warplanes bombed the Faylaq al-Sham training camp in north-west Idlib, killing 80 fighters and wounding over 100 others. Faylaq al-Sham, one of the main factions of the Syrian National Army, is Turkey’s main proxy in Syria, providing security to Turkish military posts and convoys. It was also rumoured to be the primary source of Syrian fighters sent to Libya and the Caucasus to fight alongside Ankara’s allies. In response to the attack, the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front (NLF) targeted more than 40 regime positions in Idlib, Aleppo, and Latakia, killing three Russian officers and 21 Russian soldiers, three Iranian officers, a dozen fighters from militias affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah, and at least ten regime officers, as well as wounding and killing dozens of Syrian soldiers and destroying a Russian operations centre in Ma’asran.
Since then, and following the ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2020, the tensions have eased in Idlib, with Moscow and Ankara affirming their commitment to all the previous agreements on Idlib. However, opportunities for new tensions and confrontation abound, especially as NW Syria stays under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the M4 remains closed to commercial activity.
- NW Syria is currently home to an estimated 3.5 million people; any significant regime military advances in the area will result in large-scale displacement and an influx of refugees closer to the Turkish border. The potential would exist for this influx to breach that border and cross into Turkey, posing security, economic, and political risks.
- Keeping NW Syria out of regime control leaves it within Turkey’s sphere of influence. This gives Turkey more leverage in the Astana and Geneva talks, and in other more strategic issues for Turkey, such as the future of east Syria and the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) Syrian allies.
- Control of and access to the M4, the Aleppo-Latakia international highway linking Latakia and Idlib with north-east Syria. The M4 is highly significant strategically, in terms of economic gains and mobility, and in connecting regime-held areas. Russia is adamant about reopening the M4 and gaining more access and control over the international highway, which runs from Latakia city to al-Ya’rubiyah on the Syrian-Iraqi border. In addition to much-needed intranational and international trade activity, control over the M4 would allow Russia to consolidate its forces deployed in the west and east of Syria, with direct access to Khmeimim Air Base.
- Hindering opposition factions from conducting drone attacks on Khmeimim Air Base in the south-east of Latakia.
- Control over Bab al-Hawa crossing between Turkey and Syria, due to its political and economic significance. The crossing is currently the only one authorised for the UN to deliver aid into NW Syria. It is expected that Russia and China will veto the renewal of this authorisation in July 2021.
- Control of and access to the M4, a highly strategic point in terms of economic gains, mobility, and connection between regime-held areas.
- The Assad regime is in need of a significant political or military victory (or both) to offset the rising discontent amid its own loyalists due to the unfolding collapse of the Syrian state’s economy and security. In addition, Syrian presidential elections are slated for mid-2021, and the fifth Brussels Conference on “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” takes place on 29–30 March 2021.
THE MAIN OPPOSITION ARMED FACTIONS ACTIVE IN NW SYRIA
There are two main groups of the armed opposition currently active in NW Syria
- Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) is the dominant military actor in NW Syria. HTS has followed a pragmatic approach, aiming to secure its position as the sole strategic partner with Turkey while maintaining a relatively flexible jihadist ideology, which has shifted its focus from Global Jihad to local governance. HTS has been attempting to present itself as an acceptable local opposition group by disowning its affiliation with al-Qaeda, undermining the prominent hard-core jihadist elements within it, and mounting a fierce campaign against Jihadist leaders and factions, in particular the Guardians of Religion (Hurras Eddin), which now has effectively no active presence in NW Syria.
- By the end of 2020, HTS was actively aiding Turkish soldiers in establishing and securing military posts across NW Syria. This is in addition to their takeover of all aspects of political and economic activity in and around Idlib, which would not have been possible without Turkish consent.
- The Turkish-backed National Liberation Front (NLF), under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army (SNA), which operates in the Turkish-held areas in the northern and north-eastern Aleppo countryside. In general, these groups follow Turkish instructions and are not expected to launch any attacks or engage in battle without a green light from Turkey.
POTENTIAL SCENARIOS
(Interactive maps: use the slider to compare current (left) with scenario (right) maps)
The following are the potential military conflict scenarios for the future of NW Syria in the near term (6–12 months) and an estimation of the size of the ensuing displacement. It must be noted here that displacements during a regime offensive tend to be towards non-regime areas—in this case, the north of Idlib and western Aleppo—due to several factors:
- Civilians’ fear of regime persecution.
- Civilians’ need for humanitarian assistance, usually unavailable for political reasons in regime-controlled areas.
- The regime does not usually open humanitarian corridors to allow the exit of civilians, but rather chases them out with bombardment and shelling.
Scenario 1
No major ground military operation
De-escalation continues; no major ground military operations, but intermittent violations through regime shelling on the towns south of the M4. This scenario will not cause a significant displacement of civilians.
Possible indicators:
- Continued Turkish political statements on the importance of the ceasefire in Idlib
- Continued enforcement of the Turkish military presence in Idlib, particularly south of the M4
- Decreased attacks on Turkish forces in NW Syria
- Decreased military capability of non-HTS radical Jihadi groups in NW Syria
- Regular joint Russian-Turkish military patrols along the M4
- Deepening economic and political crises in regime areas
Scenario 2
Regime forces capture areas south of the M4
Probability: Possible
Regime forces launch a limited military ground operation, capturing areas south of the M4 and Jabal al-Zawiya. This scenario will result in a wave of displacement (approximately 100,000–150,000 people) from the towns and villages in the captured areas towards northern Idlib and into Turkish-held areas in the Aleppo countryside.
Possible indicators:
- Turkish withdrawal or repositioning of military posts in Jabal al-Zawiya
- Increased hostilities against the joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on the M4 highway
- Regime and Russian aerial/ground attacks on the towns south of the M4
- Increased Russian reports of drone attacks by opposition forces on Khmeimim Air Base
- Increased deployment of Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese fighters to southern Idlib
- Increased reports in pro-regime and Russian media outlets about upcoming military operations in Idlib
- Russian official statements on the risk of radical armed groups in Idlib
- Cessation of the joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on the M4
- Increased political tensions between Turkey and Russia
Scenario 3
Regime forces capture Jisr Al-Shughour and south of the M4
Probability: Possible
Regime forces launch a military ground operation and capture all territory to the south of the M4 in addition to Jisr al-Shughour city and the Latakia countryside. This scenario will result in a large displacement wave (approximately 400,000 people) from towns south of the M4 and Jisr al-Shugour city into northern Idlib and the Aleppo countryside.
Possible indicators:
- Increased hostilities against the joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on the M4 highway
- Regime and Russian aerial/ground attacks on the towns south of the M4, Jisr Al-Shughour city, and Latakia’s northern countryside
- Increased Russian reports of drone attacks by opposition forces on Khmeimim Air Base
- Increased deployment of Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese fighters to southern Idlib and northern Hama
- Increased reports in pro-regime and Russian media outlets about upcoming military operations in Idlib
- Russian official statements on the risk of radical armed groups in Idlib
- Cessation of the joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on the M4
- Increased political tensions between Turkey and Russia
Scenario 4
Regime Forces Reach Bab al-Hawa Crossing
Regime forces launch a military ground operation, capture Atarib, Daret Izza, and Dana cities, and reach the Bab al-Hawa crossing on the Turkish border, cutting the connection between NW Syria and the Turkish-held area in northern Aleppo. This scenario will result in a very large wave of displacement (approximately 1 million people) from those cities towards north-west Idlib and the Turkish-held areas.
Possible indicators:
- Increased political tensions between Turkey and Russia
- Turkey withdrawing or significantly decreasing its military presence in NW Syria
- Relocation of Faylaq al-Sham and National Army fighters from Idlib towards northern Aleppo
- Russian official statements on the risk of radical armed groups in Idlib
- Cessation of the joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on the M4
- Increased deployment of Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese fighters to southern Idlib, northern Hama, and western Aleppo
- Russian aerial attacks on key towns, cities, and IDP camps across Idlib and western Aleppo
Scenario 5
Regime Forces Capture All of NW Syria
Regime forces launch a major military operation and capture the entirety of NW Syria. This scenario will result in a massive and unprecedented wave of displacement (approximately 3 million people) from Idlib towards the Turkish-held area in northern Aleppo, with large groups of IDPs attempting to cross the border into Turkey.
Possible indicators:
- Increased political tension between Turkey and Russia
- Turkey withdrawing or significantly decreasing its military presence in NW Syria
- Relocation of Faylaq al-Sham and National Army fighters from Idlib towards northern Aleppo
- Russian official statements on the risk of radical armed groups in Idlib
- Cessation of the joint Russian-Turkish military patrols on the M4
- Increased deployment of Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese fighters to southern Idlib, northern Hama, and western Aleppo
- Russian aerial attacks on key towns, cities, and IDP camps across Idlib, northern Latakia, and western Aleppo.
Scenario 6
Full Implementation of the Ceasefire in NW Syria
Full implementation of the ceasefire in NW Syria. Turkish-led efforts to undertake significant reforms in the military and governance structure in NW Syria succeed, leading to either the dissolution or limited role of HTS and other more radical groups.
Possible indicators:
- Turkey installing their supported factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA) as the sole military power securing the M4
- Significantly increased flow of Turkish-backed SNA troops from Turkish-held areas into NW Syria
- Handing over of Bab al-Hawa crossing to the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government (SIG)
- SIG returning to HTS areas in NW Syria, to officially take up its role as an administrative power and engage publicly with Local Councils and Directorates
- Increased assassinations and attacks against HTS commanders
- Turkish government providing direct support for service provision and administrative bodies in NW Syria
* NOTE: Unless otherwise indicated, “Aleppo,” “Idlib,” “Hama,” and “Latakia” refer to the governorates bearing those names, not the cities.
† For the purpose of this analysis, the term north-west Syria (NW Syria) is used to refer to the opposition-held areas of Idlib province, Aleppo’s western countryside, and a small enclave of Latakia’s northern countryside.
